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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Howard Locke appeals from his judgment of conviction asserting that the

. Mr. Locke asserts that his
second DUI conviction should not have been enhanced to a felony because he did not
have two prior DUI convictions when he committed the second DUI offense.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
On October 19, 2007, Mr. Locke was arrested for his first DUI offense.
(R., p.52.) A few months later, on March 20, 2008, Mr. Locke drove a motor vehicle
with a BAC amount greater than the legal limited and committed the instant offense (his
second DUI). (R., pp.45-46.) Nearly two months later, the Boise City Attorney's Office
accused Mr. Locke by Complaint with a misdemeanor DUI, in the district court.
(R., pp.07-08.) A summons was authorized to be issued. (R., p.09.) Mr. Locke was
served the summons on June 11, 2008, and arraigned on July 9, 2008. (R., p.3.) The
court scheduled the jury trial for October 23, 2008. (R., p.3.) Between the time he was
served with the summons on the second DUI and before the arraignment date,
Mr. Locke had been arrested on a third DUI. (R., p.52.)
On October 7, 2008, the State filed an amended complaint in the instant case.

(R., pp.11-12.) The prosecutor accused Mr. Locke of having a BAC in excess of .20,
nevertheless continued to prosecute the offense as a misdemeanor. (R., pp.11-12.)
The court bound Mr. Locke over and the prosecutor filed an Information charging
Mr. Locke with felony DUI. (R., pp.45-46.)

Mr. Locke filed a motion to dismiss asserting that it was factually impossible to
have two prior guilty convictions on a second DUI offense. (R., pp.46-50.) Mr. Locke
filed a memorandum in support.
memorandum in opposition.

(R., pp.51-55.)

(R., pp.58-64.)

The State objected and filed its

The matter proceeded to a hearing.

(R., p.65.)
The district court denied Mr. Locke's motion finding that the plain language of the
statute did not distinguish about when the offense took place, but instead when a
person plead guilty. (R., pp.66-70.) Thereafter, Mr. Locke entered a conditional plea of
guilty, preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss.
(R., pp.78-79.) The district court imposed upon Mr. Locke a unified sentence of ten
years, with two years fixed, and suspended execution of the sentence, placing
Mr. Locke on probation for ten years.
(R., pp.88-90.)

(R., pp.82-87.)

Mr. Locke timely appealed.

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Locke's motion to dismiss because his
second DUI should not have been enhanced because it is factually impossible to have
two prior DUI convictions prior to the second DUI offense being committed?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Locke's Motion To Dismiss Because His
Second DUI Should Not Have Been Enhanced Because It Is Factuallv Impossible To
Have Two Prior DUI Convictions Prior To The Second DUI Offense Being Committed
A.

Introduction
Mr. Locke asserts that because it is practically impossible to have two guilty DUI

pleas prior to his second DUI offense, he could not be guilty of a felony DUI.
6.

Standard Of Review
Construction and application of statutes are purely legal questions and, therefore,

reviewing courts exercise free review. McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 135 ldaho 328, 332, 17
P.2d 272, 276 (2000); Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 ldaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997). When
faced with the interpretation of a statute, the appellate court begins with an examination
of the statute's literal words. State V. Burnight, 133 ldaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219
(1999). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court must
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v.
Beard, 135 ldaho 641,646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (2001).
C.

Mr. Locke Asserts That The Law And Statute Reauire Him To Have Been Found
Guilty Of Two Prior DUI Offenses Before An Offense Mav Be Enhanced And
Because The Instant Case Involves His Second DUI Offense It Is Virtually
Impossible For Him To Have Committed Two Prior Offenses
Mr. Locke asserts that the district court erred denying his motion to dismiss

because at the moment he committed his second DUI offense, it was impossible for him
to have had two prior DUI offenses, much less two guilty pleas or convictions.
Mr. Locke recognizes that ldaho Code 318-8004 provides that:

It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or
any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs
andlor any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more,
as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a
highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the
public.
ldaho Code $18-8004 (2008). He further recognizes that any DUI offense beyond his
second DUI offense committed within certain time periods could be enhanced to a
felony DUI. ldaho Code $18-8005(5) provides:
Except as provided in section 18-8004C, ldaho Code, any person who
pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section
18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho Code, who previously has been found
guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or more violations of the provisions of
section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho Code, or any substantially
conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination thereof, within
ten (10) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld
judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony. . . .
ldaho Code $18-8005(5) (2008) (emphasis added). Thus, ldaho Code 318-8005(5)
permits the enhancement of a third misdemeanor DUI to a felony where a defendant
"has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or more violations of the provisions
of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho Code. . . ." Id.
In State v. Craig, the ldaho Supreme Court answered the question of whether a
second DUI conviction must precede a third DUI violation before the prosecuting
attorney could charge the defendant with a felony DUI on the third violation. State v.
Craig, I 1 7 ldaho 983, 984, 793 P.2d 215, 216 (1990). The Craig Court found that the
second DUI conviction did not have to precede the third violation. Id. at 217, 793 P.2d

The instant case is distinguishable, however, because it is the second offense
that the State wants to punish as the felony. In Craig, it's the third violation and the two
prior offenses had already been committed before Craig committed the third offense. In
1991, the ldaho Supreme Court recognized what Mr. Locke is attempting to argue, "The
DUI statute requires only that there are two prior DUI convictions within the previous
five years, for a third to constitute a felony with enhanced punishment." State v.
Garrett, 119 ldaho 878, 886, 81 1 P.2d 488, 493 (1991) (the Court deemed it irrelevant
that the State failed to charge Garrett with a "DUI, Second Offense).
In State

V.

Scott, the ldaho Court of Appeals found that the statute identified a

look back period from the date of the pending offense. State v. Scott, 135 ldaho 457,
459, 19 P.3d 771, 773 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Pusey, 128 ldaho 647, 648, 917
P.2d 804, 805 (Ct. App. 1996)). The Scott Court reversed the district court's decision to
include a DUI offense that the defendant pled guilty to outside the look back period by a
few days, but wherein that offense he was sentenced to within the designated look back
period. Id. at 458, 19 P.3d at 770. Therefore, Scott's third DUI offense could not be
enhanced because the Legislature deemed the guilty plea or conviction date to be the
triggering event. Id. at 459-460, 19 P.3d at 773-74.
The DUI enhancement statute is a recidivism statute that increases penalties for
repeat behavior. State v. Lamb, 147 ldaho 133, 135, 206 P.3d 497, 499 (Ct. App.
2009). Because the purpose of the statute is to treat repeat offenders more harshly, it is
essential that the commission of other offenses take place prior to the enhancement
being placed on the violation. See State v. Craig, 117 ldaho at 987, 793 P.2d at 219
(Bistline, J., dissenting); Cf State v. Brandt, 110 ldaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App.

1986) (noting that the purpose of the persistent violator laws is to punish repeat
offenders more harshly). Before treating a repeat offender more harshly, "a defendant
should be entitled to an opportunity to reform himself between convictions or that the
persistent violator statute seeks to warn first time offenders." State v. Mace, 133 ldaho
903, 906, 994 P2.d 1066, 1069 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting State v. Brandt, 110 ldaho at
344, 715 P.2d at 1014) (finding that multiple convictions entered on the same day
constituted a single conviction for purposes of the persistent violator statute).
"The principle of lenity mandates that criminal statutes be read narrowly and,
where ambiguity exists, in a manner that provides leniency toward defendants." Stafe v.
Harrington, 133 ldaho 563, 566, 990 P.2d 144, 147 (Ct. App. 1999). The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that a criminal statute must give fair
warning of the conduct that it makes crimal. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,
350-52 (1964). The rule of lenity is considered a manifestation of the fair warning
requirement under the right to due process. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 26566 (1997); see also Stafe v. Anderson, 145 ldaho 99, 175 P.3d 788 (2008) (citations
omitted) ("The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in
favor of defendants.") and State v. Shanks, 139 ldaho 152, 75 P.3d 206 (Ct. App. 2003)
(recognizing the application of the rule of lenity to an ambiguous statute in ldaho). The
United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an ambiguous
statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated:
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored

interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.
Id. at 1001-1002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the

premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the
quintessential requirements of due process of law.

Inherent in the concept of fair

warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas further spoke to this premise in a
concurring opinion in United States v. R.I.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). They concluded
"that it is not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal
statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Once it is
determined that the statutory text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient
interpretation prevail." Id. at 293 (Scalia concurring). The Justices further stated that
the consideration of legislative history "compromises the purposes of the lenity rule: to
assure that the criminal statutes provide a fair warning of what conduct is considered
illegal." Id.
Moreover, Idaho, its citizens "are presumptively charged with knowledge of the
law once the laws are passed." Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205,
1211 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Afkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (applying the
presumptive knowledge standard to a due process claim that a defendant was not given
actual notice of a potential DUI enhancement).) Thus, if the due process notice
requirement is satisfied merely by the passing of the law, where the law in the instant
case is at best ambiguous, and most likely specifically excludes Mr. Locke's future

conduct for purposes of an enhancement, this Court cannot find anyway but in favor of
Mr. Locke. Not only was Mr. Locke deprived of presumptive notice as a result of the
ambiguous statute, but the actual notice Mr. Locke received upon his first misdemeanor
DUI conviction was insufficient to give him notice that upon this instant conviction, his
case could be enhanced to a felony. The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of
justice and to protect Mr. Locke's due process rights, this Court should find that a
second DUI offense cannot be treated more harshly than a third offense. Accordingly,
as is articulated herein, the district court erred in denying Mr. Locke's motion to dismiss
because looking back from Mr. Locke's second DUI offense, he did not commit two
other DUls which would have authorized the State to enhance the second DUI offense.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Locke respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to dismiss.
DATED this 26thday of January, 2010.
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